FODOR PSYCHOSEMANTICS PDF

He received his A. From until his retirement in he was State of New Jersey Professor of philosophy and cognitive science at Rutgers University in New Jersey , where he was emeritus. He is shy and voluble at the same time Disagreeing with Jerry on a philosophical issue, especially one dear to his heart, can be a chastening experience His quickness of mind, inventiveness, and sharp wit are not to be tangled with before your first cup of coffee in the morning.

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Reading his book requires a fair amount of technical knowledge in philosophy of mind and language. This book is very important for anyone who is interested in the project of naturalizing intentionality.

In this chapter, Fodor motivates an account of crude causal theory of mental content, which roughly states that all instantiations cause one to token a concept. So, an instantiation of red i. However, he presents a philosophical problem of naturalizing mental content known as the "disjunction problem", which is that an instantiation of cow OR horse can cause one to token the concept HORSE In a certain condition, a cow can look like a horse.

In other words, one needs a theory of mental representation that includes the phenomenon of misrepresentation. However, if one thinks that the semantic content of mental representation amounts to one event is sufficient for causing someone to token a concept, then counterfactually there is another event that likewise is sufficient for causing someone to token a same concept.

Be warned. The strategy in this book is fairly straightforward - put up a straw man as your opponent, and knock him down. For myself, the clearest indication of this is in his discussion of holism. Whilst Fodor elucidates some useful distinctions that need to be borne in mind concerning holism such as confirmation holism v.

Or so he says. The chapter ends with him sneaking the bathwater in the back door, and leaving the baby outside, although I should probably leave the reader to decide the issue for themselves. This chapter was really a turning point in the book for me. I admired the construction of his theory, despite lacking sympathy. Wittily annihilating a caricature of a view is humorous, but ultimately unpersuasive.

I will expect more humorous horse-play and counterfactual tinkering with his own theory , more claiming to distrust modal intuitions, despite invoking them heavily , but above all, more fun.

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Causal Theories of Mental Content

Introduction Content is what is said, asserted, thought, believed, desired, hoped for, etc. Mental content is the content had by mental states and processes. Causal theories of mental content attempt to explain what gives thoughts, beliefs, desires, and so forth their contents. They attempt to explain how thoughts can be about things. Dennis Stampe , who played an important role in initiating contemporary interest in causal theories, drew attention to related problems. Consider a photograph of one of two identical twins.

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Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind

Reading his book requires a fair amount of technical knowledge in philosophy of mind and language. This book is very important for anyone who is interested in the project of naturalizing intentionality. In this chapter, Fodor motivates an account of crude causal theory of mental content, which roughly states that all instantiations cause one to token a concept. So, an instantiation of red i. However, he presents a philosophical problem of naturalizing mental content known as the "disjunction problem", which is that an instantiation of cow OR horse can cause one to token the concept HORSE In a certain condition, a cow can look like a horse. In other words, one needs a theory of mental representation that includes the phenomenon of misrepresentation. However, if one thinks that the semantic content of mental representation amounts to one event is sufficient for causing someone to token a concept, then counterfactually there is another event that likewise is sufficient for causing someone to token a same concept.

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Psychosemantics

Disida In us, it might be that we interpret our experience as picking out the one rather than all the alternatives because our language allow us to carve things up in this fine-grained way and then implicitly theorize about what is indicated. When we show movies of rabbit parts coming together, pulling apart, we see that two such nodes are activated when apart, one node when together, and this tracks the psychophysics, etc. I skimmed the paper quickly and was quite pleased to discover a blob named after me! If we are talking about the function of some neuronal region, then the neuronal details will tend to matter more.

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Jerry Fodor

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